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Infill redevelopment—the transformation of previously used urban sites—is generally regarded as an 
important way to attain environmental and urban sustainability goals. At many locales, however, such 
urban renewal, community development, and tax revenue goals must be reconciled with historic 
preservation objectives. Are economic incentives and regulatory relief useful tools for encouraging 
reuse of abandoned or underutilized urban sites with historic buildings? Answering this question is of 
key importance for many European cities and for older US cities, and has important implications in 
terms of urban sustainability and “smart growth” initiatives.  
We use conjoint choice experiments to explore the relative importance of economic incentives, 
regulatory relief, land use and property regime offerings at underutilized historical sites in Venice, 
Italy. We survey real estate developers and investors, and ask them to choose between pairs of 
hypothetical projects in three Venice locations, as well as between one of these projects and the 
alternative to do a development project elsewhere.  
Statistical models of the responses to these choice questions indicate that respondents are sensitive to 
the price of acquiring the land (and hence to any policies that influence prices), and especially 
sensitive to the property regime that would be granted to developers and investors and to the 
allowable land use. Contrary to expectations, our respondents were insensitive to tightening or 
relaxing the stringency of building conservation restrictions. Our findings sound a common theme 
with Howland (2004), who warns that redevelopment of previously used sites in Baltimore is 
impaired by obsolete land uses, zoning and infrastructure (but not by suspected or actual 
contamination). We conclude that the City should focus on offering land uses and property regimes 
that are more in tune with developer demand.  
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1. Introduction and Motivation 
Local and national governments have traditionally used zoning and land 
use restrictions, as well as regulation and economic incentives, to influence and 
shape cities, neighbourhoods within cities, and local economic activities. Infill 
redevelopment—the transformation of previously used urban sites—is generally 
regarded as an important way to attain environmental and urban sustainability 
goals, and a key component of “Smart Growth” initiatives. At many locales, 
however, such urban renewal, community development, and tax revenue goals 
must be reconciled with historic preservation objectives (ICMA, 2003; Noonan, 
2006).  
A number of economic incentives, regulatory and liability relief tools are 
currently available or under consideration at many locales to encourage urban 
infill redevelopment (see Bartik, 2004). De Sousa (2000), Alberini et al., (2005), 
and Wernstedt et al. (2006), have studied the desirability of policies targeted at 
idle and contaminated properties by directly interviewing developers and other 
potentially affected parties.  
Are the same or similar incentives useful when the abandoned or 
underutilized urban infill sites are properties of historical, artistic or architectural 
interest? In this paper, we attempt to answer this question focusing on a specific 
city (Venice, Italy) where such sites are in abundant supply, and on the 
economic agents most directly involved in redevelopment decisions (real estate 
developers and investors). We use survey-based stated-preference methods.  
Earlier literature has assessed the attractiveness of economic inducements 
to developers by observing the occurrence of actual redevelopment projects and 
land use changes as economic incentives are established (or repealed) over time 
or by exploiting their variation over a relatively broad geographical area or 
jurisdiction (Bartik, 2004). These studies have used regression analyses and 
controlled for other characteristics of properties or policies thought to influence 
redevelopment. 
Unfortunately, these analyses are not possible with buildings with 
historical and cultural value in Venice due to (1) the lack of transactions (these 
buildings or complexes are owned by the local or national government, and are  
currently sitting idle), (2) the lack of policy variation over space and time, and 
(3) the very small study area. Moreover, if even transactions did occur, (4) there 
is a pervasive price misreporting problem.
1 We circumvent these problems by 
using stated-preference methods and asking people what they would do under 
well-specified hypothetical circumstances. 
In our questionnaire we query real estate developers about the factors that 
they find attractive (or unattractive) in a place like Venice, and on the policy 
offerings that could be devised to attract real estate development projects and 
investments in the city. We ask a series of direct questions to investigate the 
former issue, and deploy a stated-preference approach to answer the latter.  
The stated-preference questions in our survey instrument are conjoint 
choice experiments that ask respondents to focus attention on three abandoned or 
underused areas in the city of Venice—namely, (i) the Santa Marta Waterfront, 
and (ii) Arsenale Darsena Grande, the central portion of the Arsenale, the ancient 
shipbuilding yard, and (iii) Arsenale Bacini, the easternmost part of the 
Arsenale. Of these three areas, the one with the highest historic value, and the 
one that is currently subject to the most restrictive conservation requirements, is 
(ii). All of the three areas are currently owned by the local or the national 
government, and an important decision to be made is whether they can be sold, 
or merely leased, to private parties. 
We propose hypothetical development projects described by a total of 7 
attributes: (i) location (one of the three abovementioned locations), (ii) allowable 
use (commercial or light industrial with an emphasis on artisanal production 
activities); (iii) access (current or improved by rapid transit systems); (iv) 
presence or absence of conservation restrictions; (v) property regime (lease or 
full property), and (vi) cost per square meter, which includes the cost of the 
purchase or lease and development costs, and ranges from €400 to 4000.  
One advantage of this approach is that it lets us examine behaviours 
under circumstances that have not been observed in real life before. Another is 
that, since attributes are varied independently and simultaneously, it lets us 
disentangle the separate effects of policies that are often bundled together in real 
                                                           
1 Property taxes are calculated using a different approach than in the U.S. This different approach  
life. For example, historic building or district designations at many locales imply 
both tax credits or other subsidies (which reduce the net price of the land or 
building) and restrictions on renovations and use of the building.  
We find that, contrary to what is often stated in policy circles, 
conservation restrictions are not a deterrent to development projects at the three 
Venice locations here studied. What truly matters to developers is the property 
regime and the allowed land use. Specifically, they dislike leases and strongly 
prefer full property; they also dislike being limited to light industrial uses—a 
type of land use that is strongly favoured by city officials, on the grounds that it 
protects traditional handcrafting and small businesses—and strongly prefer 
commercial uses. Although our respondents are not sensitive to an explicit 
“improved transportation and access” attributes, it is clear that the most remote 
Venice locale studied here is relatively unattractive, and that the Venice area that 
is judged as most attractive is the only one with full car, truck and rail access.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides 
background information about the study areas. Section 3 discusses our research 
questions and reviews the literature. Section 4 describes the conjoint choice 
approach, its application to the three underutilized areas of Venice studied here, 
and the econometric models of the responses to the choice questions. Section 5 
describes the questionnaire and the survey administration. Section 6 describes 
the data and section 7 the results of the econometric model of the responses to 
the choice questions. We offer concluding remarks in section 8.  
 
2. Background  
This study focuses on three areas in the city of Venice: The Waterfront in 
the S. Marta neighbourhood, the historic portion of the Arsenale, and the 
northeast portion of the Arsenale (Arsenale Bacini).  We chose these areas for 
four reasons: (i) they are comparatively large, (ii) they are unique, (iii) they are 
in very different locations, and (iv) they are faced with varying degrees of 
conservation restrictions on buildings and structures. Specifically, the most 
                                                                                                                                                            
has encouraged buyers and sellers to underreport the sale price.   
stringent requirements apply at the historic Arsenale, while the other two locales 
are subject to very modest or no requirements at all.  
The Venice Arsenale—the ancient shipbuilding yard of the Republic of 
Venice—was founded in the 1100s, accounts for about 15% of the area of the 
city of Venice, and is currently owned by the Italian government. In the second 
half of the 1500s, dockyard organization was restructured to attain both 
horizontal and vertical integration (Clark and Pinder, 1999). The Arsenale 
started to decline after World War I, and continued to decline at an even faster 
rate after World War II, when its buildings were progressively abandoned. In 
1983 the Soprintendenza per i Beni Ambientali ed Architettonici of Venice 
started a series of conservation works. One important feature of the Arsenale is 
that it is one of the few sites in Venice with potential for a large-scale 
transformation (Clark and Pinder, 1999). Another striking feature of the 
Arsenale is that because of its location within the city and because of its limited 
access via public transportation, it has remained outside of the traditional tourist 
routes. 
As mentioned, we restrict attention to two portions of the Arsenale. The 
first is the historic part of the Arsenale around the so-called Darsena Grande. 
This area includes a basin that can be used as a marina, as well as historic 
buildings erected over the course of several centuries. The south of the Darsena 
Grande houses Tesoni Gotici and the Corderie, two highly prized buildings 
owned by the Italian Navy. The Capannone (Warehouse) lies in the north of the 
Darsena. This structure was re-built by the Austrian Government in the 19
th 
century and is currently owned by the Italian national government and by the 
municipality of Venice. The west Darsena has a building dating back to the 18
th 
century, known as the Squadratori, owned by the Italian Navy. All of these 
buildings are subject to historic conservation restrictions. The Darsena Grande is 
accessible on foot directly from the nearby residential district of Castello, and by 
water, both by private and public transit boats. It also has docking areas and boat 
slips. The majority of its buildings are abandoned, as a result of a slow decline 
that started after World War II. At present, only a few buildings are used by the  
Navy as offices and by the municipality of Venice as museums or for special 
temporary exhibits.  
The other portion of the Arsenale this study is concerned with is Bacini 
(Shipbuilding docks), which is used for shipbuilding and boat repairs, and has 
several buildings, but no particular historic value. The Venice Transit Authority 
houses its vaporetti (public transit boats) here. The Bacini area cannot be 
accessed directly by car or truck, and is far from the train station, but a proposal 
is currently under consideration that would connect it directly to the airport via 
an underground rail system. Because it is relatively large, this area could be 
reused for shipbuilding purposes, but also for housing, hotels, recreational 
structures, laboratories and offices. The City would allow buildings without 
special historic status to be demolished and rebuilt with a different layout.  
  In contrast with the other two locations, the S. Marta Waterfront can be 
accessed directly by car and truck, is close to the train station, is easily reached 
by water, and is served by the public transportation system.  There are several 
abandoned buildings and facilities in this area, including warehouses, the old 
gasometers and related facilities, and former manufacturing plants. Observers as 
well as city officials concur that this area is suitable for offices, university 
buildings, sports and recreational facilities, port authority and small 
manufacturing plants, and housing.  
 
3. Research Questions and Previous Literature 
This paper focuses on three major research questions. The first is whether 
historic building or area designations attract or deter real estate investors, which 
leads to the natural question whether these properties may be made more 
appealing to developers by relaxing development/conservation restrictions (or, 
conversely, by offering “enhanced” historic designation). The second is whether 
traditional economic incentives for economic development can be deployed 
successfully with areas or buildings of historic values, and if they can be 
combined or traded off with historic building conservation requirements.  The 
third is whether we can identify specific groups of developers to whom the  
regulatory relief tools and incentives are especially appealing, so that local 
governments can target them. 
The research questions of this paper are tied with three major strands of 
the literature. The first is the empirical literature that has examined the effects of 
historic building or district designations. Asabere and Huffman (1991) argue that 
since zoning and historical district requirements are associated with restrictions 
on development rights, those parties that invest in certified historical structures 
are accepting a “substantial degree of functionality and physical disutility,” 
which in turn increases business risk. This disincentive should be reflected in 
property values, and is likely to be even stronger for non-residential properties. 
Their empirical analysis shows that vacant properties in the historical district of 
Philadelphia in the late 1980s did sell for higher prices, all else the same, than 
properties outside of the historical district, suggesting that at this locale the 
positive externality effects of historical districting—which is a form of zoning—
outweighed the negative effects of restrictions on development.  
Cyrenne et al. (2006) ask a similar question for Winnipeg, Manitoba, but 
use assessed values instead of sale prices, individual historic buildings instead of 
vacant parcels, and a panel dataset, which allows them to control for unobserved 
neighborhood characteristics potentially correlated with property values. They 
compare buildings that qualify for (i) a downtown historical building tax credit 
and (ii) a city-wide heritage building tax credit program with “control” buildings 
that do not meet historic designations but are located in the same area as the 
qualifying buildings. Cyrenne et al. find evidence of a negative externality from 
being located close to historic buildings. Moreover, they find that rehabilitation 
expenditures increase the value of buildings, but that they are not fully 
capitalized—the marginal effect of renovation expenditures is $0.33 for every 
dollar of expenditure.  
Noonan (2007) uses transactions of attached homes in Chicago to 
examine the effects of landmarks and historical districts on residential property 
values. Noonan is particularly concerned about correlated but omitted factors 
that explain property prices. To avoid falsely attributing to landmarks and 
historical districts effects on property prices that are truly due to these omitted  
factors, he deploys the repeat-sale approach and treats the error terms in his 
regression equation as spatially correlated.  
The second strand of the literature relevant to this paper is the extensive 
and rather controversial empirical literature about the effectiveness of local 
economic development incentives. Such incentives typically include industrial 
development bonds, tax credits for job creation or business location, property tax 
abatement, tax increment financing, and downtown development authorities. 
Recent studies suggest a statistically significant, positive relationship 
between tax incentives and regional and local growth and property values 
(Bartik, 1991; Greenstone and Moretti, 2003; Newman and Sullivan, 1988; 
Wasylenko, 1997), but researchers dispute the magnitude of the impacts of 
incentives on overall economic gains in targeted areas (Fisher and Peters, 1998; 
Fox and Murray, 2004; Peters and Fisher, 2002).   
Research in this area is afflicted by the problem that concurrent 
incentives at the same locale make it very difficult to disentangle the effect of 
each individual incentive, a problem that can be remedied only by deploying 
very careful quasi-experimental approaches with control and treatment groups 
(Bartik, 2004; Greenstone and Moretti, 2003).
2  In general, it remains difficult to 
ascertain whether incentives were effective or business locations and/or area 
redevelopment would have taken place even in their absence (Peters and Fisher, 
2004).   
Finally, we wish to emphasize that we are interested in the reuse of 
historical buildings or complexes of buildings, and that this can be broadly 
interpreted as an example of infill redevelopment. We are not aware of previous 
empirical work that has assessed the effectiveness of economic incentives and 
policies aimed at stimulating the reuse of abandoned/underutilized sites of 
historical and artistic significance. To our knowledge, earlier research has 
usually focused on situations where infill redevelopment is complicated by the 
actual or suspected presence of contamination, which triggers liability and 
increases the costs and riskiness of projects because of the necessary 
environmental inquiries and remediation (McGrath, 2000). Much attention has  
been devoted as of late to the so-called “brownfields”— abandoned or 
underutilized sites without with suspected or confirmed contamination problems.  
Economic inducements and regulatory and liability relief have indeed 
been advocated as potentially effective for stimulating cleanup and 
redevelopment of brownfields (Bartsch et al., 1996; DeSousa, 2004; Howland, 
2000, 2004; Yount and Meyer, 1999).  The empirical literature assessing the 
effectiveness of these instruments is limited and the evidence is mixed. Liability 
relief, for example, attracts participation in voluntary cleanup programs, but does 
not necessarily result in much remediation activity (Alberini, 2007) nor in 
improved property transaction rates (Sementelli and Simons, 1997).  
On their part, real estate developers claim that they are responsive to a 
broad range of inducements.  In surveys in Europe (Alberini et al., 2005) and in 
the US (Wernstedt et al., 2006) choice experiments suggest that developers can 
be attracted to contaminated sites by offering them subsidies, liability relief, and 
less stringent regulation. Prior experience with projects at contaminated sites 
matters, in the sense that these incentives do not appeal to the same extent to all 
developers.   
It remains to be seen, however, whether similar incentives will work with 
abandoned or underutilized of historical, artistic and architectural significance, 
and whether the latter are subject to similar reservations. These are precisely the 
issues that we explore in this paper using conjoint choice experiments.  
 
4. Conjoint Choice Experiments and Econometric Models of the Responses  
In this section, we first describe conjoint choice experiments and then 
provide details on the design and structure of the conjoint choice experiment 
questions in our study. 
 
A. Conjoint Choice Experiments 
  Conjoint choice experiments are a survey-based technique used to 
investigate the tradeoffs that people are prepared to make between different 
goods or policies. This technique can be used to find the monetary value that 
                                                                                                                                                            
2 See Meyer (1996) for a lucid presentation of experimental and quasi-experimental approaches  
people ascribe to goods or to the benefits of a policy, as long as one of the 
attributes is the “price” of the good or the cost of the policy to the respondent. It 
is a stated-preference technique, in that it relies on what individuals say they 
would do under hypothetical circumstances, rather than observing actual 
behaviors in marketplaces. 
  In a typical conjoint choice experiment survey, respondent are shown 
alternative variants of a good described by a set of attributes, and are asked to 
choose their most preferred (Hanley et al., 2001). The alternatives differ from 
one another in the levels taken by two or more of the attributes.  
  One advantage of conjoint choice experiments—and of stated-preference 
methods in general—is that they allow the analyst to study people’s 
responsiveness to goods, levels of environmental quality, or policy offering that 
do not currently exist. Another major advantage is that the attributes can be 
manipulated independently of one another, allowing the analyst to disentangle 
their effects separately. This is a great advantage when in real life attributes tend 
to be bundled together. For example, at many locales historic building or district 
designations imply both tax credits or other subsidies (a plus), and conservation 
and use restrictions (a minus).  Conjoint choice experiments are also a very 
flexible technique, in that it can be adapted to a variety of policies and situations.  
 
B. Our Conjoint Choice Experiments  
In our conjoint choice experiments, the alternatives were hypothetical 
real estate development projects at four possible locations in Venice: (i) the 
Waterfront in the S. Marta neighbourhood, (ii) Arsenale Darsena Grande, the 
middle portion of the Arsenale, the historic shipbuilding, (iii) Arsenale Bacini, 
the north-eastern part of the Arsenale, which is currently used for shipbuilding, 
and (iv) a “generic” real estate investment project elsewhere. The alternative 
projects were described by four more attributes, in addition to the location: (i) 
access (at the current level or improved), (ii) allowed use (commercial or light 
industrial with an emphasis on artisanal/handicraft activities), (iii) building 
                                                                                                                                                            
in econometrics.   
preservation restrictions (required or not required), (iv) property regime (full 
private property or lease), and (v) price per square meter.   
Attributes and levels of the attributes are summarized in table 1. We 
arrived at this list of attributes after consulting with local public officials and a 
small number of real estate developers and real estate agents specializing in the 
commercial sector.  Regarding use, the City Master Plan and much of the debate 
in City circles have focused on commercial and light industrial uses for these 
locations. Light industrial use, in particular, is argued to fulfil the goal of 
protecting traditional handcrafting and boat building activities.  
It should be emphasized that attributes (ii), (iii) and (iv) could be altered 
through changes in the City’s policy or through negotiations with developers on 
an individual basis (see Stellin and Zoboli, 2006). The City could also offer tax 
credits or other subsidies to developers in order to encourage reuse of the three 
abandoned or underused areas studied here, in which case such offerings would 
be captured into attribute (v)—price per square meter.  
A series of sample conjoint choice questions is reproduced in the 
Appendix. As shown in Figure A.1, we first asked respondents to choose 
between hypothetical projects A and B, each entailing a transformation of one of 
the three areas in Venice. This question was followed by another binary choice 
question that asked respondents which they would prefer—the project they had 
just chosen in the previous exercise, which is in Venice, or a typical project for 
their firm to be undertaken elsewhere? This latter choice task is shown in Figure 
A.2. 
Each respondent was shown a total of 4 project A-project B pairs (both in 
Venice), plus 4 questions where the respondent was asked to choose between the 
Venice project just selected and a project elsewhere, for a total of 8 conjoint 
choice questions.  
  
Table 1. Attributes and attribute levels in the conjoint choice experiments. 
Attribute   Levels of the attribute 
Location S.  Marta 
Arsenale Darsena Grande (Marina) 
Arsenale Bacini (Shipbuilding Yard) 
Land use   Commercial  
Light Industrial 
Access   Current  
Improved  
Building Conservation as per Regulations  Required 
Not required 
Property rights  Full property 
Lease  
Cost per square meter (in euro)  400, 800, 1500, 2500, 4000 
 
 
C. Econometric Model  
The statistical analysis of the responses to conjoint choice questions 
relies on the random utility model (RUM) (see Alberini et al., 2007). In this 
paper, we assume that respondent i’s indirect utility (or a rescaled measure of 
profit) from alternative j is  
(1)   ij ij ij ij C V ε β + ⋅ + = 2 1 β x , 
where  ij C  is the price of the property (expressed in euro per square meter), x is 
the vector of the other attributes of the alternatives, and  ij ε  is an error term that 
captures individual- and alternative-specific factors that influence utility (or 
rescaled profits), but are not observable to the researcher.  
We assume that when faced with two hypothetical projects, respondents 
choose the alternative in the choice set that gives them the higher utility or 
profits. To derive the statistical model of the responses, we begin by considering 
the response to the first pair of alternatives examined by the respondent. Denote 
these two alternatives as A and B. By design, both A and B are Venice projects. 
Because the size of the choice set is 2, and this is a “forced choice” question  
(i.e., the respondent must choose one of these two projects), we must develop an 
expression for the probability of a binary outcome.  
If the error terms ε are i.i.d. draws from a normal distribution such that 
iA iB i ε ε ε − = Δ  is a standard normal, the probability that a respondent chooses 
alternative A over alternative B is: 
(2)   ) ( ) Pr( )   chooses   Pr( 2 1 β w β x i i i i C A i Δ Φ = ⋅ Δ + Δ < Δ = β ε ,  
























) (⋅ Φ  is the standard normal cdf.  
  Suppose that the respondent indicates that he prefers A over B. He is then 
asked which he would judge more attractive—A, or another project elsewhere 
(at a location other than Venice).  Because one of the two alternatives being 
compared in this latter question—namely, A—depends on the response to the 
previous choice question, it can be shown that the appropriate contribution to the 
likelihood is that of a panel-data probit with length of the panel equal to 2 
(Cameron and Quiggin, 1994). To illustrate, the probability that the respondent 
chooses A between A and B, and A again between A and a project elsewhere is: 
(3)     ) , , ( ) , Pr( 2 1 ρ β w β w i i A A Δ Δ Φ = ,  
where  1 i w Δ  is the vector of differences between the attributes of alternatives A 
and B,  2 i w Δ  is the vector of differences between the attributes of A and those of 
the project at another location altogether, and  ) , , ( 2 1 ρ z z Φ  is the bivariate 
standard normal cdf with arguments  1 z  and  2 z  and correlation coefficient ρ. 
When we pool the responses to all conjoint choice questions, the 
likelihood function is: 
(4)   [] [] [] []
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where m=1, …, 4 denotes the pair of Venice-based alternatives, P1im is the 
probability that the respondent exhibited the sequence (A,A) with pair m (see 
equation (3)),  P2im is the probability of observing sequence (A,O) for pair m 
(where O=project at Other location), P3im is the probability of observing 
sequence (B,B) for pair m, and, finally, P4im is the probability of observing  
sequence (B,O) for pair m. The dummies I1im,  I2im, I3im and I4im denote the 
indicated sequences of responses.
3  
Implicit in equation (4) is the assumption that the error terms ε are 
independent across pairs of projects in Venice within the same respondent. They 
are also assumed to be independent across respondents. Coefficients β are 
estimated using the method of Maximum Likelihood. 
 
D. Regressors  
  Vector x includes two Venice location dummies, namely SMARTA and  
ARSGRANDE.  It also includes ACCESSO, a dummy denoting whether access 
to the site is improved over the current level, and USO, a dummy taking on 
value of one if the site is slated for commercial uses and zero if the site is slated 
for light industrial/artisanal uses.  
  Also included in x are RESTAURO, a dummy taking on a value of one if 
building conservation restrictions apply at the site, and zero otherwise, and 
PROPRIETA, a dummy taking on a value of one if development can take place 
only under a lease from the government (which is the owner of the three Venice 
sites studied in the questionnaire and in this paper), and zero if a regular private 
property regime is envisioned.   
  In sum, all binary attributes are coded as 0/1 binary variables, while the 
price per square meter is entered in the model as a continuous variable. We 
represent the “investment elsewhere” project by using an alternative-specific 
dummy and by coding all attributes corresponding to this alternative to zero. Our 
basic specification of the probit model of the responses (4) includes all of these 
regressors. We also estimate additional specifications where some of these 
attributes are interacted with characteristics of the respondent’s firm and of its 
typical projects.  
 
                                                           
3 An (A,A) sequence would therefore result in the following values for these four dummies: (1, 
0, 0, 0).   
5. Structure of the Questionnaire and Survey Administration  
  Our survey questionnaire is self-administered by the respondents using 
stand-alone computers or on-line, and is divided into 4 sections.  
 In  section 1, we ask the respondent to describe the nature of his or her 
company’s business. Is it a real estate development company, a real estate 
investment firm or bank, a lender, or a consulting outfit that works primarily for 
developers? If the respondent’s company has done development projects in the 
last five years, we ask him or her to describe three of them to us: Where did each 
take place? Was it a residential, industrial, or commercial project? Was it an 
office building? Did the company sell it, lease it to tenants, or does it manage it 
directly? And what was the volume built? 
  Next, we ask the respondent to tell us if his company does residential, 
commercial, or industrial projects, or office buildings, and what percent of all 
projects are accounted for each of these types.  We recognize that pinpointing 
exact percentages might be difficult, so we provide ranges (0-20%, 21-40%, 41-
60%, 61-80%, or 81-100%) to facilitate the respondent’s task. We also inquire 
which markets the respondent’s company usually does these projects in—is it 
the Veneto (the Region in Italy whose capital city is Venice
4)? Northern Italy? 
The rest of Italy? Abroad?  
  This section ends with questions about development projects and 
decisions. We show respondents a list of factors surrounding real estate deals 
and investments, and ask them to tell us if each of these factors is “always,” 
“almost always,” “often,”  “sometimes” or “never” crucial in their investment 
decisions. These factors include the possibility of negotiating with local 
authorities, zoning and building conservation constraints, limits on the time 
needed for permits, and many others.  
In the last screen of section 1, we ask respondents what they usually look 
for when making investment decisions: New buildings in turn-key conditions? 
Existing buildings that need some restructuring? Parcels without buildings?   
Derelict sites that must be regenerated?  
                                                           
4 We remind the reader than in Italy, the Region is a jurisdiction (not a mere geographical area) 
with powers and authority similar to those of a State in the US and a Province in Canada.   
  Section 2 of the questionnaire is about Venice. We first wish to find out 
whether the respondent’s company has ever done any real estate development in 
Venice proper or the Venice hinterland, and, if so, what type of projects. Then, 
we wish to find out whether the respondent would ever consider Venice and the 
Venice hinterland for development projects.  If the answer is “yes,” respondents 
are to pinpoint the reasons why they find Venice attractive for business out of a 
list of possibilities. If the answer is “no,” we show them a list of possible 
disadvantages of Venice as a location for business, and ask them to indicate 
which ones apply to them.  
  The purpose of asking these questions is two-fold. First, it is of 
independent interest to find out what makes Venice attractive or unattractive to 
developers. Second, by making respondents focus on the pros and the cons of 
doing business in Venice, these questions serve as a useful “bridge” towards 
section 3 of the questionnaire—the conjoint choice questions.   
The conjoint choice questions (see section 3 of this paper for a discussion 
of the attributes, and Figures A.1 and A.2 for examples) are preceded by a brief 
description of the S. Marta and the two Arsenale developable areas. Respondents 
wishing to obtain fuller descriptions of these areas are offered the option to do so 
by launching hyperlinks on the screen (see Figure A.3 in the Appendix). 
   The fourth and last section of the questionnaire asks general questions 
about the annual revenue of the company, its headquarters, whether the company 
is partly owned or controlled by a government entity, and the position held by 
the respondent within the company.  
  Ideally, we would have liked to administer the questionnaire to a sample 
representative of the universe of developers based in Italy and in other European 
countries. We had a list of developers that do business in the Milan area and in 
the Veneto, and we contacted these firms by e-mail and over the telephone, 
asking them to complete our questionnaire on-line. This approach resulted in a 
total of 38 completed questionnaires. After several solicitations, three 
“recalcitrant” developers finally agreed to meet with one of our interviewers in 
their offices and filled out the questionnaire using a laptop computer.      
Since our list cannot be considered exhaustive, and at any rate we had 
only been able to gather a total 41 completed questionnaires in this way, we 
expanded our sample by going to professional real estate developer meetings and 
trade fairs, where we asked attendees to participate in the survey on the spot. We 
were able to obtain 60 completed questionnaires at the MIPIM trade fair in 
Cannes, France, in March 2006 and 45 more questionnaires at the REAG in 
Milan, Italy, in May 2006.  (The UrbanPromo conference in November 2005 in 
Venice, Italy, served as the testing grounds for an earlier draft of the 
questionnaire, which was administered to a total of 10 attendees.) 
 
6. The Data 
A. Characteristics of the Respondents and of their Investment Projects 
  Our first order of business is to examine the characteristics of the 
respondents, the companies they represent, and the development projects that 
their companies undertake. As shown in table 2, developers account for over 
one-half of our sample (51.77%), and the second most heavily represented 
category is consultants or advisors to real estate developers or investors (22%). 
Lenders, construction companies, and real estate investment firms account each 
for 7% of the sample.   
 
Table 2. Type of firm or company (N=141) 
TIPOIMP  PERCENT OF THE SAMPLE 
Developer 51.77 
Construction company  7.09 
Lender providing financing to firms  7.80 
Real estate investment   7.80 
Loans and savings  1.42 
Consultant/advisor 21.99 
Other   2.13 
 
 
  Regarding the headquarters of the company, 87.23% are based in Italy 
and 12.77% in other countries. Only 5.84% of the respondents reported that their  
firm was partially owned or controlled by a government entity. Figure 1 displays 
information about the distribution of annual revenue, showing that companies 
with annual revenue greater than €10 million account for over two-thirds of the 
sample, and that for about 36% of the companies in the sample the annual 
revenue is above €50 million.  
  What type of projects do our respondents’ companies do? About 85.5% 
of the companies do office buildings, 89.9% do shopping malls and commercial 
projects, 41% do projects entailing industrial land uses, and 69% do residential 
projects. A vast majority of these projects (85-90%, depending on the type) take 
place in Italy. Table 3 shows the degree of diversification of operations of each 
firm:  Only for less than 10% of the sample does a specific type of projects 
account for the lion’s share (81-100%) of all projects.  
  
Figure 1. 
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Table 3. Type of projects as share of total projects.  
  percent of the sample 
percent of all projects  office 
buildings 
commercial industrial residential 
0-20    25.64 36.89 40.35 22.92 
21-40   38.46 42.62 31.58 28.13 
41-60   18.8 9.84 10.53 22.92 
61-80   11.97 3.28 10.53 16.67 
81-100   5.13 7.38 7.02 9.38 
 N=117  N=122  N=57  N=96 
 
 
  Table 4 summarizes the respondents’ views of crucial aspects of 
development decisions. Opportunities for agreements with local governments 
(item 1) are “always” or “almost always” crucial for over two-thirds of the 
sample, as are warranties and reassurances on the time needed to get permits 
(item 3). The possibility of purchasing the property (item 4)—as opposed to 
leasing it—is also important, as are the prestige of the location (item 11), and, of 
course, the cost of the property (item 12) and construction costs (item 13).  
  Regarding  the duration of the lease (item 5), the possibility of 
subdividing the development project or building (item 6), the presence of land 
use and historic-architectural conservation restrictions (item 7), environmental 
impact assessment requirements (item 8), and proximity to transportation nodes 
and network (items 9-10), respondents were more evenly distributed among the 
various response categories.  
  As shown in table 5, 26 respondents (18.31% of the sample) have 
previously done real estate development in Venice and 26 have done projects in 
the Venice hinterland. Specifically, 15 respondents has done projects in Venice 
proper but not in the hinterland, 15 reports having done projects in the Venice 
mainland but not in the city of Venice, and 11 have done projects at both 
locations.  
  When asked whether they would consider Venice as a possible location 
for business, 74% and 63% of the respondents indicated that they would, for the  
city of Venice and its hinterland, respectively. What’s even more astounding is 
that only 22 respondents (15% of the sample) said that they would not consider 
either location.  
  
 
Table 4. When making investment decisions, which of the factors listed below is 
crucial? Percentage of respondents who selected the indicated category. (N=142) 
  Always   Almost 
always 
Often   Sometimes   Never  
1. Agreements with 
local authorities   44.37  23.24  14.79  12.68  4.93 
2. Tax exemptions  11.27 12.68  16.9  35.92  23.24 
3. Guarantees on 
the terms necessary 
for authorizations 
and permits  35.92 30.28  20.42  8.45  4.93 
4. Full property   52.82 20.42  15.49  7.04  4.23 
5. Duration of the 
lease (if leased)  32.39  16.9 11.97 16.2 22.54 
6. Possibility of 
subdividing the 
property  22.54 23.94  27.46  22.54  3.52 
7. Zoning and 
building 
conservation 
restrictions  35.92 21.83  17.61  19.72  4.93 
8. Required 
Environmental 
Impact Assessment   19.72  17.61 17.61 26.06 19.01 
9. Closeness to a 
highway 17.61  16.9  26.06  32.39  7.04 
10. Closeness to an 
airport   11.97  12.68  21.83  36.62  16.9 
11. Prestige of the 
location  48.59 27.46  16.9  6.34  0.7  
12. Price  66.2  18.31  9.86  4.93  0.7 
13. Construction 





Table 5. Actual and potential interest in Venice as project/investment locale. 
N=142. 







  Venice   the Venice 
hinterland 
Venice the  Venice 
hinterland 
No 81.69  81.69 26.06 37.32
Yes 18.31  18.31 73.94 62.68
 
 
C. Responses to the Conjoint Choice Questions  
  Table 6 reports the relative frequency of the various response categories 
for the conjoint choice questions. In choice questions 2, 3, and 4, the percentage 
of “project A” and “project B” responses is generally well-balanced, suggesting 
that there were no obviously superior alternatives. Only in choice question 1, 
almost two-thirds of the respondents selected project A. Comparison between 
the responses to questions 1-4 and those to questions 1a-4a suggests that when 
pressed to indicate which they would prefer—the previously selected project in 
Venice or a project elsewhere—almost 50% of the respondents announced that 
they would still choose the Venice project and a little over 50% would take the 
project at another location.  
  








CHOOSE “A PROJECT 
ELSEWHERE”* 
1 64.08  35.92   
1-a 30.99  15.49  53.52 
2 50.70  49.30   
2-a 26.06  22.54  51.41 
3 53.52  46.48   
3-a 26.06  17.61  56.34 
4   51.41  48.59   
4-a 18.31  22.54  59.15 
* Choose “another project elsewhere” or confirm the project selected in the immediately 
preceding choice question. 
 
7. Econometric Estimation Results 
We report the estimation results for model (4) in table 7. Panel (A) 
reports our basic specification, which includes only the attributes of the 
alternatives.  Panel (B) reports the results of a specification that includes 
interactions between selected attributes of the alternatives and characteristics of 
the respondent’s firm (or of its projects). 
Panel (A) shows that, all else the same, our respondents consider S. 
Marta roughly equally desirable as a generic, non-Venice location for their 
development projects. The Arsenale Darsena Grande location is slightly less 
preferred, but is judged more desirable than the Arsenale Bacini location. This 
makes sense to us: S. Marta is accessible by car, truck and rail, and is thus, for 
all practical purposes, perfectly comparable to a non-Venice location. The 
Arsenale locations are probably too difficult to reach; in the case of the Bacini, 
its shipbuilding facilities may be too specialized to appeal to broad group of 
developers.  
At first, we were surprised that the coefficient of the attribute indicating 
improved access was not statistically significant, but we believe that this is due 
to the fact that respondents are already indicating a preference for Santa Marta, 
which is already fully accessible by car, truck and rail. (We experimented with  
entering an interaction between the access attribute and the Arsenale locations, 
but the coefficient on this interaction term was small (-0.07) and statistically 
insignificant (t statistic=-0.46).) 
Relaxing the conservation requirements does not make a difference to our 
respondents, suggesting that, after all, the presence of such restrictions is neither 
the deal maker nor breaker in a city like Venice. By contrast, USO and 
PROPRIETA have strong effects on the likelihood of preferring an alternative 
over another. The coefficients on these attributes indicate clearly that 
respondents reject hypothetical projects that are slated for light industrial or 
artisanal uses, preferring, all else the same, projects slated for commercial use. 
They also shun government leases, preferring the full private property.  
The coefficient on price per square meter is negative and significant, as 
expected. This suggests that developers will probably respond to financial 
incentives, as long as these can readily be translated into net land prices.  
To get a sense of the magnitude of the coefficients, suppose a real estate 
developer were to choose between two projects at Santa Marta. Both imply full 
property and a price per square meter of €1500. Santa Marta project A is slated 
for commercial use, while Santa Marta project B is slated for light 
industrial/handicraft production use. Model (A) predicts that the probability that 
A is preferred is 0.6932. It would take a large increase in the price of A (to 
€4000) and a dramatic discount on the price per square meter of B (to €400) to 
make the two projects at this locale closer to one another in terms of desirability: 
Changing the prices in this way reduces the probability of still choosing A to 
0.5336 and brings the probability of choosing B to 0.4664.  
If the City further decided that project A can be offered only with a lease, 
instead of fully transferring the property to the developer, the probability that the 
developer chooses A would fall to 0.4029, while that of preferring B would rise 
to 0.5971. Santa Marta project A would now be less preferred than a commercial 
project at the Arsenale Grande with full property and the same price per square 
foot (€4000) (the probabilities being 0.40 and 0.60, respectively). 
A commercial project at Santa Marta with full property remains less 
preferred than a project at any other non-Venice location when the price per  
square meter is €1500 per square meter or higher, but would become more 
preferred at lower land prices. For example, if the price per square meter at Santa 
Marta were €400, the probability of choosing the Santa Marta location would be 
54% (versus 46% for the “other” location), and if it was €800, the probability of 
choosing Santa Marta would be 52%.  
Panel (B) of table 7 shows that the attractiveness of non-Venice locations 
for development project do vary across company types. Respondents who 
describe their company as a real estate development firm are more averse to 
Venice locations than others. We attribute this result to the reputation of the 
local administration and the complex political reality in the City, which is judged 
as relatively unfriendly by developers, a business-minded group that seeks a fast 
turnaround for its investments. 
The magnitude of the coefficient on the term [alternative-specific 
intercept] ×[ 80% or more industrial projects] indicates that respondents from 
companies that do primarily industrial projects almost always choose the non-
Venice location when asked between a non-Venice project and a Venice project. 
Clearly, this is confirming the unattractiveness of Venice locations for industrial 
uses.  
By contrast, those companies that do primarily commercial projects seem 
to find Venice an attractive market, probably because of the residents’ and 
tourists’ demand for retail and wholesale shopping and a lack of supermarkets in 
Venice. This is our interpretation for the negative and significant coefficient on 
[an alternative-specific intercept] ×[80% or more commercial projects]. 
We also checked whether those respondents who judge zoning and 
conservation restrictions as always important can be appealed to by relaxing 
conservation restrictions in Venice. The coefficient on the interaction between 
this attribute and a dummy capturing those respondents has the expected sign 
(negative) but is statistically insignificant, as is the coefficient on the interaction 
between the dummy capturing these respondents and the “investment elsewhere” 
alternative-specific intercept. The latter coefficient is positive, suggesting that 
there is weak evidence that these persons would prefer locales that are less likely 
to have conservation restrictions in place.  
Finally, respondents for whom the full property regime is always 
important are more deterred from leases than the other respondents. This 
effect—which can be inferred from the coefficient on the term [full property] × 
[full property “always” crucial in project decisions]—approaches, but does quite 
make, the 10% significance level.  
The last term we entered in the model was an interaction between the 
alternative-specific intercept and a dummy denoting whether the respondent 
always regards agreements with local governments as a crucial factor in making 
investment decisions. We decided to enter this variable in the model because 
several respondents in the course of the survey literally blurted out that they 
considered the city of Venice unreliable and unwilling to cooperate with 
developers and real estate investors. The coefficient on this variable is 
positive—which would seem to confirm the notion that companies who give 
high priority to agreements with local government when making investment 
decisions tend to prefer locales other than Venice—but very small and 
statistically insignificant.   
  
Table 7. Probit model results. 
  (A) Basic specification  
(B) Specification with 
interactions 
Variable  coefficient  t statistic  coefficient  t statistic 
Santa Marta  0.234018 2.56 0.238216  2.58
Arsenale Darsena Grande  0.15686 1.95 0.145699  1.79
Access 0.093533 1.22 0.081505  1.06
Conservation restrictions   -0.00414 -0.06 0.042835  0.48
Use 0.505225 7.29 0.510783  7.26
Full property  -0.33029 -4.79 -0.21941  -2.37
Price per square meter  -0.00012 -4.41 -0.00013  -4.67
Alternative-specific intercept* 0.264073 2.43 0.065323  0.45
Alternative-specific intercept × 
Developer     0.262789  2.23
Alternative-specific intercept × 
(mostly industrial)     1.386414  2.67
Alternative-specific intercept × 
(mostly commercial)     -0.496  -2.09
Alternative-specific intercept × 
(building company)     -0.10151  -0.45
Alternative-specific intercept × 
(zoning and historic conservation 
restrictions always important)       0.105624  0.75
Conservation restrictions × 
(zoning and historic conservation 
restrictions always important)      -0.14595  -0.98
Full property × (full property 
always important)     -0.19927  -1.62
Alternative-specific intercept × 
(agreements with local 
governments always important)    0.049472  0.41
Nobs 1136   1136 
Number responses  568   568 
log likelihood  -728.97   -713.77 
Rho 0.072386 0.98 .07032    .93
LR test Rho=0  0.96   0.86 
p value LR test  0.163   0.176  
* Investment at another, non-Venice location. 
 
 
8. Discussion and Conclusions.  
  We have used conjoint choice questions to explore the preferences of real 
estate developers and investors for projects in Venice involving the reuse of 
abandoned or underused areas that have historical, artistic and architectural 
value.  
  The results of our models raise doubts about the concerns sometimes 
expressed by city officials and observers, who fear that conservation restrictions 
may have a deterrent effect on non-local investors. We find that the presence of 
conservation restrictions is not a deterrent to investment and redevelopment 
projects at the locations with historical and architectural value in Venice. 
Conversely, relaxing existing conservation restrictions does not have any effect 
on the attractiveness of the locations we focused on.  We checked with real 
estate agents that specialize in the commercial sector in Venice, and they told us 
that developers take it for granted that construction in Venice must follow 
prescribed conservation regulations. Indeed, the market itself demands buildings 
that comply with such conservation requirements (Rosato et al., 2006). 
  By contrast, our respondents tended to avoid alternatives slated for light 
industrial use, and wanted the full property, rather than a lease from the 
government.  These results are consistent with the opinions about the importance 
of certain aspects of an investment project reported by the respondent in another 
section of the questionnaire. They also point out to the need for the City to be in 
tune with developer demand for specific types of land uses. In that sense, our 
findings sound a common theme with Howland (2004), who warn that obsolete 
zoning, land use, and infrastructure may hinder development more than other 
factors (environmental contamination in her study, historic preservation 
requirements in ours). That historic buildings at locales outside of Venice in 
reasonable shape but subject to very specific zoning and use restrictions have 
remained unsold at a recent auction (Unknown Author, 2006
5) seems to confirm 
                                                           
5 This piece of news appeared in The Gazzettino, the local Venice and Veneto newspaper.    
this point.  Based on these findings, we would recommend flexibility in the land 
use and property regime options to be offered by City officials to individual 
developers.  
  We find it encouraging—both from the point of view of consistency with 
economic theory and that of policy—that respondents do respond to the price of 
acquiring and redeveloping the land. This means that it might be possible to 
encourage them to undertake projects in Venice by offering them appropriate 
financial incentive packages. 
  In the end, it is difficult to say if our findings can be extrapolated to other 
“cities of art” or the historical districts of cities in Europe and in the US, given 
the uniqueness of Venice. Our approach, however, should be relatively 
straightforward to adopt at other locales where conservation restrictions are 
perceived as a hindrance to urban revitalization and reuse of existing structure, 
and where well-guided public policies are needed to offset them.   
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Figure A.1: Example of Choice between two Venice alternatives 
  





Figure A.3: Description of Venice investment sites: S. Marta 
 
 
 